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When electoral results are particularly shocking, the geological metaphor of the earthquake is 
quite common among political commentators and academics alike. The 2018 Italian election 
bears no exception as it has been described by many1 as a ‘political earthquake’ whose 
aftershocks have been perceived elsewhere, especially in Brussels. If the Italian election of 2013, 
however, has been defined already as an ‘electoral earthquake’ (Chiaramonte and De Sio 2014), 
then, how to characterize those of 2018 without the risk of being redundant? What we argue is 
that the last two Italian elections are part of the same telluric movement whose effects however 
have had an impact at different times on different arenas. The arenas that we take into account, 
in this regard, are three: the electoral arena, the parliamentary arena, and the governmental 
arena, following the theoretical framework proposed by Bardi and Mair (2008). In this sense, if 
the election of 2013 has been the ‘earthquake’, that of 2018 can be interpreted as its consequent 
ferocious ‘tsunami’, arriving later to complete the destructive process initiated by the 
antecedent seismic tremor. In fact, the Italian party system, far from settling down after 2013 
(when the earthquake has been perceived in the electoral and parliamentary arenas), has 
suffered a further violent shock in the 2018 election (when the tsunami has concerned the 
governmental arena as well). 
The aim of this article is to assess to what extent this ‘change’ has been real or only perceived 
and how much the arenas that compose of the political and the party system have been modified 
by this ‘tsunami’ election. In order to do this, we measure the magnitude of this change using a 
series of indicators for each of the arenas. The time span taken into consideration is the 1948-
2018 period, with a specific focus on the last 25 years, namely since the watershed election of 
1994 that completely reshaped the party system after the collapse of the so-called ‘First 
Republic’. The article proceeds as follows: in the first section, we describe the 2018 Italian 
election, highlighting how much of the (very scarce, due to their newness) literature has focused 
more on the electoral and parliamentary effects on the party system (Chiaramonte and 
Emanuele 2018) and on the winners and losers: mainly, the Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S) and 
the Lega on one side vis-à-vis the Partito Democratico (PD) on the other (De Sio 2018, Orsina 2018). 
In the subsequent section, we review the literature on party systems applied to the Italian case, 
focusing in particular on the polarized pluralism (Sartori 1976), the imperfect bipartitism (Galli 
1967), the fragmented bipolarism (D’Alimonte 2005) and the transition towards the new 
tripolarism (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2018), and discuss the tripartite theoretical framework 
of political parties’ functional arenas (Bardi and Mair 2008). Then, the following methodological 
                                                             
1 Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2018), but also a variety of political comments by, among others, BBC, 
Euronews and Votewatch.  
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paragraph explains how we measure the impact of change within the three arenas, before 
providing some detailed descriptive statistics of them for the period 1948-2018 (sections 4, 5 and 
6). The seventh section discusses the interaction between the party system change in the three 
arenas, identifying the main differences between the ‘critical junctures’ (in particular, 1994 and 
the dyad 2013-2018); the final section draws a number of conclusions and briefly discusses the 
potential future development of the Italian party system. 
 
2. The Italian election of 2018 
The 2018 Italian general election was held on 4 March 2018 after the Italian Parliament was 
dissolved by President Sergio Mattarella at the end of December 2017. Italian voters were called 
to elect the 630 members of the Chamber of Deputies and the 315 elective members of the 
Senate of the Republic for the XVIII legislature of the Italian Republic since 1948. The center-right 
coalition won a plurality of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate and Matteo 
Salvini's Lega emerged as its main component. The anti-establishment M5S led by Luigi Di Maio 
became the party with the largest number of votes, and the center-left coalition, led by former 
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, came third. However, no political group or party won an outright 
majority, resulting in a political stalemate. After three months of negotiations, an agreement was 
finally found on 1 June between the M5S and the Lega, whose leaders both became Deputy Prime 
Ministers in a government led by the M5S-linked non-parliamentarian Giuseppe Conte, a 
professor of law from the University of Florence, as Prime Minister. 
The beginning of something new was immediately recognized and legitimized by the same 
protagonists of the election. For instance, Luigi Di Maio, leader of the new biggest party, the 
M5S, and generally perceived as one of the winners of the election (although Matteo Salvini’s 
Lega had increased by four times its votes in respect to the previous election), immediately 
declared the birth of a new ‘Third Republic’.2 The rhetoric of this epochal change is also 
confirmed by the informal name the M5s and the Lega have chosen for their coalition executive 
as the ‘Government of the Change’. From the general point of view of format and mechanics, 
the party system resulting from the 2018 election presents a substantially tripolar configuration 
as it had been in the 2013 election.  
However, after the 2013 election, some schiolars spoke of the ‘three poles and half’ party system 
(Cotta and Verzichelli 2016), due the importance, during the election of the so-called ‘third pole’, 
the three-party coalition led by the incumbent Prime Minister Mario Monti (Pasquino 2013). 
Actually, it was only the fourth force in terms of votes and seats, definitely far from the center-
left, the center-right and the M5S. This could not be taken for granted after five years, bearing 
in mind that the 2013 result could have constituted only a temporary deviation from the 
bipolarism that had been the norm until then. Despite the reconfirmation of a tripolar structure, 
the party system is once again characterized by some important transformations. The first 
evidence is that, for the first time, the forces originating from the old ‘constitutional arch’ are 
only in the third position, after the center-right coalition and the M5s. Also, the parties that only 
                                                             
2 The M5s had already been the most voted party in the 2013 elections, not including the four ‘Italians 
abroad’ constituencies. Despite this, since they were not part of a broader coalition, the M5s did not elect 
then the highest number of parliamentarians. The PD obtained the bonus of seats, granted by the 
Porcellum electoral system. 
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ten years before had almost monopolized the Parliament (PD and Popolo della Libertà), winning 
together 758 seats out 945, this time obtained only 34 per cent of parliamentarians.  
From a broader perspective, the Italian vote of 2018 has represented a watershed moment, with 
the greatest success of anti-establishment parties in the panorama of Western Europe since the 
post-war period. This result is exceptional for at least three reasons. First of all, the success of 
the M5S is unique in the panorama of Western Europe: among the parties with the best electoral 
debut (25.6 per cent in 2013), no one had ever managed to do better (in this case, almost +7 
percentage points) in its second test. Secondly, Salvini’s Lega, capitalizing on the transformation 
of the old Lega Nord (‘Northern League’) into a new radical right national League, has also 
reached an undeniable electoral success, quadrupling the votes and practically reaching the PD 
levels. Thirdly and on the contrary, the strategy of Renzi’s PD, aimed at the conquest of the 
center and hinged on Europe and civil rights, led to the worst result of the left3 in Republican 
history (De Sio 2018).  
However, notwithstanding these first impressions, we aim at empirically evaluating from what 
to what the Italian party system has evolved. The next section traces the theoretical framework 
of the three arenas of political party competition, while the following sections describe them in 
detail. 
 
3. Party systems and the three functional arenas of political parties 
Party systems are, indeed, something different from ‘a mere sum of their parts’ (Mair 2006). The 
literature generally agrees on the basic definition of what a party system is; namely that the 
existence of a party system as such implies that within a plurality of parties there are interactions 
between these parties (Sartori 1976). Simply, ‘sets of parties’, where there are not interactions 
between parties, are different from ‘systems of parties’. Despite the seminal work of Sartori, 
which aimed to systematize what he defined as a ‘plethora’ of definitions of party systems, such 
a term continued to be used in a broad sense.  
However, the distinction between a set of parties and a system of parties is not only theoretical. 
The lack of the ‘systematic nature’ of a group of parties is not only an analytical element but it 
takes place concretely when parties (therefore, sets of parties) operate in an environment 
lacking a systemic identity and hence also systemic constraints. When volatility and fluidity of 
parties of this environment are very high, they can make the patterned interactions fail to 
emerge and no real system develops. This was observed to be the case, for example, of the new 
established democracies in the post-communist Europe (Mair 1997). Sartori, who aimed at 
classifying all the extant cases of party systems, would have defined it as an ‘atomized system’. 
That insistence of the literature on the classification of party systems was one of the reasons for 
the persistence of a lack of conceptualization of the constituent elements of a party system. This 
shortcoming has often made the analysis of the change of party systems difficult and not 
systematic.  
Bardi and Mair (2008) tried to overcome this gap by understanding party systems as 
multidimensional phenomena, identifying and discussing the implications of three types of 
division: vertical, horizontal and functional. The vertical division corresponds to the existence of 
                                                             
3 Considering only the main party on the left side of the political spectrum, namely the PD, thus excluding 
the smaller formation at the left of it (Liberi e Uguali and Potere al Popolo). 
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some relevant cleavages in society, in addition to the classical left-right axis, which force voters 
to choose only parties belonging to their national, language or religious constituencies. It is the 
case of Belgian Francophone parties not allowed to run in the Flemish region and vice versa or 
the very low probability for a Unionist citizen in Northern Ireland to vote for a Republican party 
or vice versa. In these cases, thus, two or more party systems coexist in the same polity. This is 
clear for the electoral arena, while within the parliament forms of interaction can exist.  
The horizontal division takes place when different elections are held in the same polity to elect 
different elective bodies. On such occasions, parties may have different strategies, for example 
not running in some elections or forging different electoral alliances. This is the case, for 
example, of local parties in the French-speaking Quebec, which individually run in the provincial 
elections, but run in the Canadian federal elections jointly within the Bloc Québécois. Or it is also 
the case of Denmark, where the People’s Movement against the European Union only runs in 
the European elections but does not run in the national and local ones.  
However, Bardi and Mair’s more refined conceptualization concerns the functional divisions of 
the party system. This emerges from the existence of different competitive arenas: electoral, 
parliamentary and governmental. The difference between the electoral party system, on the one 
hand, and the parliamentary party system, on the other (Bardi 1996) can be very evident: the 
fundamental logic for parties within the electoral arena is to survive, so to fight on every possible 
single vote (competition prevails). But this can happen through different strategies, as the logic 
of competition is strongly influenced by the electoral system. For example, in plurality systems, 
where everything is decided in a single round, the direction of the competition is centripetal. The 
fight for votes is concentrated on the median and centrist voters and parties tend to cooperate 
and to form broad electoral coalitions. On the contrary, where proportional laws exist, the 
direction of the competition tends to be centrifugal, according to which parties try to reach all 
the several and dispersed niches of voters. Finally, in majority systems (e.g. France), during the 
first round parties behave in an all-against-all competition, as they were in a proportional system; 
in the second round, they usually form alliances, by withdrawing those candidates with fewer 
chances to win and supporting those with more potentialities. In the parliamentary arena, the 
coalition formation logic is more diffused (cooperation prevails). In many political system, the 
electoral formulas do not favor the emergence of a clear (and unique) winner of the elections. 
Therefore, in the parliamentary system parties work hard to shape ruling coalitions, which could 
support an executive. For this reason, very often the government arena follows the 
parliamentary logics, but in some cases, when coalition cabinets are formed, frictions tend to 
exist when junior parties behave provocatively in order to assert their presence.  
This analytical view fits very well with the Italian case, where the different arenas, already during 
the period up the 1990s, were characterized by quite different logics of competition, such as, for 
example, that the salient issues in the electoral arena might not be as salient in the parliamentary 
arena, or vice versa. In the fragmented Italian party system, for example, polarization was much 
more pronounced in the electoral arena, where parties could take extreme positions in order to 
respond to the electorate’s expectations, rather than in the parliamentary one. On the contrary, 
since the 1990s, the Italian system has proved to be much more polarized and fragmented in the 
parliamentary arena rather than in the electoral arena: parties felt the need to regain the visibility 
they had lost through the centripetal electoral competition induced by the new majoritarian 
electoral formula. In addition, the interactions between parties could also follow different 
dynamics within the governmental arena, where parties, which are allied in the electoral and 
parliamentary arenas, could be in competition even if they are part of the same executive. This 
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was, for example, the case of the taut relations between the DS and Margherita ministers in the 
second Prodi government (2006-2008) and the left-wing exponents of the same cabinet.  
Thanks to this theoretical division, it is possible to investigate the extent of ‘change’ of the Italian 
party system in the three functional arenas. In addition, particular interest has been given to the 
impact of new parties in the three different arenas.  
 
4. Methods to measure party system change 
The object of this analysis is to trace the degree of change of the Italian party system in the three 
functional arenas (electoral, parliamentary, governmental), with a particular focus on the 2018 
election. We do that by looking at two elements of the party system: volatility and innovation. 
As pointed out by Pedersen, a party system is a system of interaction resulting from inter-party 
competition, which can be observed at different levels; therefore: 
‘A concise mapping of party system change would have to cover the levels of parliament and 
government, the level of the party as an organization, and the level of the electorate. Party system 
change, then, can be defined as the total set of changes in patterns of interaction and competition 
at these three levels as well as between them’ (Pedersen 1979, 1) 
On the one hand, the indexes of volatility that we employ are calculated as follows. For the 
electoral arena, we rely on the standard index of ‘electoral volatility’ as initially developed by 
Pedersen (1979). In more general terms, it calculates the total amount of change of a given 
characteristic experienced by all individual entities in a closed system. For each entity it calculates 
the net change of a list between two-time periods, then takes the absolute value of this change 
and divides the result by the total amount of the characteristics in the system at the first and 
second time periods. Since most calculations of this nature focus only on the vote share of the 
full party system, the result of the sum of the absolute value of vote change of all parties is simply 
divided by two (Casal Bertoa, Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2017). For the parliamentary arena, 
we employ the same volatility index, where the absolute value of percentage change taken into 
consideration is however the one of parties’ share of parliamentary seats rather than votes 
(‘parliamentary volatility’).4 Finally, to calculate the volatility of the third arena, we consider the 
percentage change, between one cabinet and the subsequent, of the number of ministers 
(including the Prime Minister) occupied by politicians from a given party.  
On the other hand, the indexes of innovation that we employ are calculated as follows. For the 
electoral arena, it is the sum of the percentages of votes of all new parties in a given election. 
For the parliamentary arena, it is the sum of the percentages of seats obtained by all new parties 
in a given election5. For the governmental arena, it is the percentage of ministers (including the 
post of Prime Minister) occupied by politicians from new parties. Then, what exactly a ‘new 
party’ is? The literature has long debated on this question (Emanuele and Chiaramonte 2016). 
Starting from the most inclusive definition, Harmel and Robertson (1985) consider a relabeling 
or joint lists as a sufficient condition to consider the party a truly new entity. Other scholars 
consider necessary at least a merger (Birch 2003, Powell and Tucker 2014, Bolleyer 2013) or a split 
(Mainwaring, Gervasoni, and España-Najera 2016, Hug 2001, Tavits 2006, Zons 2015, Barnea and 
                                                             
4 The indexes of electoral and parliamentary volatility take into consideration votes and seats of the 
Chamber of the Deputies alone. 
5 For these two indicators, we focus only on votes and seats in the Chamber of Deputies. 
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Rahat 2011) to talk about new parties. Other more restrictive definitions include the presence of 
a start-up organization (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2015) or even new 
personnel (Sikk 2005, Marinova 2015) as a defining element of new parties. In this work, with the 
help of the relatively small sample, we combine a rather restrictive approach with an ad-hoc 
interpretation in case of splits. First of all, we do not consider as new parties those that have 
changed (even significantly) their names but have kept the same political personnel and similar 
ideology. Also, similarly to Emanuele and Chiaramonte (2016), we consider new parties those 
that for the first time in an election obtained more than 1 per cent of votes. For instance, we 
consider the Lega Nord as a new party only in 1992, when it obtained 8 per cent of votes, although 
the predecessor Lega Lombarda (with a very similar electoral logo, a similar ideology and the 
same leader, Umberto Bossi) was already present in the 1987 election, but had received less than 
1 per cent of votes. When existing parties merge, such as  Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and Forza Italia 
(FI) within the Popolo delle Libertà (PDL) in 2008, or DS and Margherita within the Partito 
Democratico (PD) in 2007, we do not consider these actors as new parties because of the clear 
continuity in terms of leadership, ideology and structures. In case of split, the situation is more 
complex. Generally, we do not consider as a new party the largest of those originating from the 
old one. In 1991, after the transformation of the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) in the PDS and 
the consequent split of the Partito di Rifondazione Comunista (PRC), we consider only the latter 
as a new party. An exceptional case is represented by the split of the Partito Popolare Italiano 
(PPI) in 1995. A splitting fraction was allowed to keep the name but was forced to change the 
electoral logo; the other component, led by the secretary general of the party Rocco Buttiglione, 
was allowed to keep the logo – the same of the ancient Democrazia Cristiana (DC) – but was 
required to rename into Cristiano Democratici Uniti (CDU). In this case, we do not consider either 
as a new party.  
 
5. The electoral arena 
Our analysis starts from the electoral arena. In fact, ‘even if elections are far from always being 
decisive events, they are still the best available vantage point for a study of change, because 
change will either be a result of elections, or elections will register any change which may occur 
in the party system’ (Pedersen 1979, 2). Table 1 shows the evolution of the Italian party system 
in terms of electoral volatility. 
 
ß Table 1 about here à 
 
The result of the heavily controversial6 1953 election gave birth to a political balance that would 
last for around 40 years. The DC was at the core of a centrist coalition (with the Partito Liberale, 
PLI, the Partito Social Democratico, PSDI, and the Partito Repubblicano, PRI) opposed by a strong 
left opposition (with the Partito Comunista, PCI, in a stronger position than the Partito Socialista, 
PSI) and a weaker right-wing opposition (the Partito Nazionale Monarchico, PNM, and the 
                                                             
6 Due to the super bonus of two thirds of seats, introduced by the DC-led government prior to the 
elections, to the winning coalition scoring at least 50 per cent of the votes. The centrist bloc however 
scored only 55,038 votes below the necessary threshold, so the normal proportional allocation of seats 
applied. In 1954 this provision was then repealed. 
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Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI). This set-up of the party system remained very stable until 1992. 
After the election of 1953 the electoral volatility reached 12.4 per cent, due to the strong recover 
of the left parties, but it never reached again 10 per cent before the 1990s’ party system 
reshuffling. The electoral fluxes were characterized by the continuous growth of the PCI, until 
1976, the erosion of votes for the DC (until 1983) and PSI (until 1976), and the dissolution of the 
Monarchists. Already in 1967 Giorgio Galli could coin the definition of ‘imperfect bipartitism’ 
between the DC and the PCI, even if the gap was yet of 13 per cent: only in 1983 the distance 
reached the minimum: 32.9 per cent vs 29.9.  
As it can be seen from table 2, during the first twenty years the impact of new parties was very 
limited; in the 1970s and the 1980s, however, the party system gave the first sign of instability, 
with several new parties appearing. But the first real symptom of a crisis, anticipating the 1992-
93 collapse, happened in the 1992 election. For the first time volatility overcame 10 per cent, 
reaching 18.7 per cent. The three new parties, La Rete (1.86 per cent), PRC7 (5.62 per cent) and 
the Lega Nord (LN, 8.65 per cent) jointly scored 16.1 per cent of votes. Of these three new parties 
the success of the latter was considered as a worrying alarm by many commentators (Biorcio 
1997). In fact, the LN placed itself outside of the classical left-right divide, which had 
characterized the Italian party system until then, and posed strong and populist critics towards 
the ‘system of parties’. In conclusion, it was the first time that a new party, other than the 
marginalized MSI and the already dissolved monarchists, scored so well being outside the 
Constitutional Arch. 
 
ß Table 2 about here à 
 
The legislature of the 1992 had a short life. The Mani Pulite judicial investigation and the approval 
of the mixed-majoritarian electoral system (Mattarellum) caused the complete reshape of the 
Italian party system. The electoral volatility skyrocketed at 40.9 per cent and additional three 
new parties entered the scene: Alleanza Democratica (1.2 per cent), Patto Segni (4.7 per cent) and 
above all Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, which became immediately the biggest party with 21 per 
cent of votes. In sum, these three new parties received 26.9 per cent, a level never reached 
before. These changes induced many to speak of the emergence of a so-called ‘Second Republic’, 
even if, except for the electoral system, all other constitutional aspects of the Italian democracy 
had maintained the same framework of the previous 40 years.  
The system seemed to have reached a limited stability in the following elections. In the four 
elections between 1996 and 2008, volatility only once reached 22.8 per cent (in 2001) and in 2006 
was down to the levels of 40 years earlier (8.6 per cent). However, this period was characterized 
by the birth of other new parties: Rinnovamento Italiano in 1996, Italia dei Valori, Democrazia 
Europea and the Partito dei Comunisti Italiani in 2001, the UDEUR in 2006, and finally la Destra and 
the Movimento per l’Autonomia in 2008. However, the overall shares of votes obtained by these 
                                                             
7 When the PCI transformed into the PDS most of the leadership joined the new party, which kept within 
its new electoral symbol the ancient PCI logo (Ignazi 1992). On the contrary, the PRC was led by a minor 
fraction of the former leadership and the electoral symbol, although it kept the classical hammer and 
sickle in a prominent position, was completely different from that of the PCI (Bertolino 2004). Therefore, 




new parties were much lower than the levels of the 1992-1994 period. These indicators appeared 
to confirm that the party system, at least in the electoral arena, had reached a stability. This 
seemed validated also by the fact that almost the total of the votes was concentrated in only 
two coalitions in 2006 and that the votes received by the two biggest parties in 2008, the PDL 
and the PD, reached 70.5 per cent, the second highest score after 73.1 per cent of 1976. 
This new equilibrium, however, demonstrated its fragility in the 2013 election. The ‘electoral 
earthquake’ was perceived both as very high volatility (40.3 per cent, at the same level of 1994) 
and high number of new parties, 5: Fare per Fermare il Declino (1.1 per cent), Fratelli d’Italia (1.96 
per cent), Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (3.20 per cent), the self-defined ‘third pole’ Scelta Civica (8.3 
per cent) and the effective third force of that election, and biggest party in the national territory, 
the M5S (25.6 per cent). Overall, 40.2 per cent of votes went to parties that did not exist five 
years before. From an electoral point of view, other new parties entered the scene in 2018, 
+Europa, Liberi e Uguali and Potere al Popolo, but on the whole the amount of their votes was 
only about 7 per cent. On the contrary, volatility reached the third highest level indicating that 
the new electoral context emerged from the 2013 general elections was again an instable one.  
 
6. The parliamentary Arena 
For what concerns the evolution of the format and of the dynamics of the parliamentary arena 
in comparison with those of the electoral arena, it is noteworthy that ‘institutional factors may 
also be responsible for creating different conditions of competition in the two arenas’ (Bardi and 
Mair 2008, 157-8). The electoral system is one of the most important aspects that shape the 
differences and similarities between party systems. As for the format of the party systems in the 
two arenas, it is easy to understand that the proportional formula imposed a strong similarity 
between the two. The elections of 1953 and 1992 were those with the highest electoral volatility 
and subsequently those with the highest parliamentary volatility. The same happened for party 
innovation, which was almost non-existing in both the arenas until 1992.  
 
ß Table 3 about here à 
 
As for the dynamics of competition, the analysis is more complex. The proportional system 
facilitated the establishment of a ‘polarized pluralism’ (Sartori 1966) in the electoral area, 
characterized by a centrifugal competition. However, parties that during the elections proposed 
different policy solutions and seemed to represent incompatible Weltanschauungen were able 
to negotiate and find agreements in the parliamentary arena. Even if the period 1948-1992 was 
characterized by the stability of the ruling coalition, this did not prevent the formation of a 
consensual climate on many general issues, at least amongst the parties of the ‘Constitutional 
Arch’, which allowed some commentators to define the Italian party system as ‘bargained 
pluralism’ (Hine 1993). Sartori’s and Hine’s definitions seem to be at odds, but that contradiction 
is only apparent: as the Italian party system was polarized in the electoral arena and consensual 
in the parliamentary one. Obviously, the main reason is that the electoral arena has never been 
really competitive. The DC occupied constantly the center of the system having two incompatible 
oppositions on the left and the right. The inclusive strategy of the ‘centrism’, with PSLI, the PLI 
and PRI in the ruling coalition, always characterized the DC’s behavior. The consequence was a 
continuous enlargement of the government coalition, which passed from the centrist formula of 
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the 1950s, to the center-left of the 1960s and 1970s and to the ‘pentapartito’ in the 1980s. The 
consensual imperative of the parliamentary arena is not only exemplified by the progressive 
expansion of the governmental coalition but was also characterized by other two processes. The 
first was the recurrence of the ‘external support’ from parties formally located at the opposition, 
the Monarchists and the neo-Fascists in the 1950s and the Communists in the 1970s. The second, 
and more frequent, was the sharing of public offices and state resources among parties. This 
process, which touched many sectors of society, from the management of the national health 
service to the distribution of the top-level positions in state institutions, from the introduction 
of public funding for political parties (Pizzimenti and Ignazi 2011) to the ‘occupation’ of the 
municipalized companies, was completely in line with the conceptualization of the ‘cartel party’ 
(Katz and Mair 1995, Bardi 2006).  
Things changed abruptly in 1994, when the approval of the new mixed-majoritarian electoral 
system and the judicial investigations on the ruling parties provoked a dramatic impact on the 
format and dynamics of the party system in the two arenas. The new electoral law facilitated the 
structuring of the electoral supply into three different blocs and new parties (Forza Italia overall) 
emerged. From that time on two tendencies can be measured. The first one is the divergence 
between the electoral and parliamentary volatilities, with the latter constantly higher. This effect 
is clearly due to the distortive effect of the new mixed-majoritarian system. The Mattarellum 
(which adopted the first-past-the-post formula for three-fourth of the seats) assured higher 
volatility in the parliamentary arena: 46 percent vs 40 in 1994, 21 vs 15 in 1996, 23 vs 22 in 2001. 
These gaps were almost of the same degree in the three elections run with the Porcellum system 
(which granted 340 seats to the coalition or list with the highest number of votes): parliamentary 
volatility was 13 percent vs 8 per cent of the electoral one in 2006, 24 vs 16 in 2008 and 44 vs 40 
in 2013. The second process was the great parliamentary strength of the center-left and center-
right, always able to occupy more than 90 per seats, with peaks in 2001 when only 11 seats were 
left to third parties and in 2006 when the two coalitions occupied the entire Chamber of 
Deputies. In 2008, this tendency to bipolarization seemed to lead even to a bipartization of the 
system. 
 
ß Table 4 about here à 
 
This tendency came to a complete halt in 2013. The change was immediately observed for what 
concerns the electoral supply: three coalitions running in the elections (center-right, center-left 
and center) and at least three alone-standing lists with the hope to obtain seats (M5S, Fare per 
fermare il Declino, and Rivoluzione Civile). Also in this case, high volatility in the electoral arena is 
reflected in a higher volatility in the parliamentary one (44 percent to 40), but the party 
innovation was not as strong: electoral innovation was 40 percent but it was only 26 percent in 
the parliamentary arena. This happened because the PD, an existing party, secured the bonus, 
leaving fewer seats to the new parties. For the 2018 election, the recently introduced ‘mixed’ 
electoral formula, the Rosatellum, continued to produce significant disproportional effects. The 
parliamentary volatility was high also in this election, 42 per cent, and higher than the electoral 
one. This demonstrates that the 2013 election was far from shaping a new stable party system in 
the parliamentary arena. On the contrary, the innovation caused by successful new parties was 




7. The governmental arena 
The analysis of governmental volatility and innovation shows interesting results. Table 1 presents 
the scores of governmental volatility for the 65 governments of the Italian Republican period, 
together with additional information on the government (party of the Prime Minister, cabinet 
size and share of ministers between technocratic or independent ministers, new parties and 
established parties). Figure 1 shows graphically the trend of governmental volatility, and table 6 
presents detailed information on governmental innovation. 
 
ß Table 5 about here à 
 
First of all, it is worth noting that until 1994 total volatility (the change in ministers representing 
different parties) was constantly below 50 percent: the majority of ministers were always DC 
members. Volatility was due to the change of quotas between the parties of the government’s 
coalition: four parties of the ‘centrism’ formula (other than the DC, also PLI, PSDI and PRI) 
between 1948 and 1963, and four of the ‘center-left’ experience (with the PSI replacing the PLI 
in the governmental coalition), and the five of the ‘pentapartito’ (DC, PSI, PLI, PSDI and PRI) 
between 1981 and 1993. Volatility in the governmental arena did not reflect electoral or 
parliamentary volatilities nor the transition from one governmental formula to another, but 
rather the relationships between parliamentary parties. The transition phases where 
characterized by ‘monochrome’ DC-led or centrist executives with the external support (without 
direct ministerial participation) of parties officially in the opposition: this was the case of the MSI 
and Monarchists’ support to the Tambroni executive in 1960, the socialist support to the Fanfani 
IV executive in 1962 and the communist support to the Andreotti III executive in 1976. These 
experiments were clearly attempts to enlarge the governmental coalition at a later stage. This 
happened with the entry of the PSI in the first ‘center-left’ cabinet in 1963, which is also the only 
case of innovation that happened in the governmental arena before 1993. Noteworthy is also 
that from 1948 until 1981, all the Prime Ministers were Christian Democrats. This informal rule 
was broken in 1981, when the Republican Giovanni Spadolini became Prime Minister and again in 
1983, when it was the time for the Socialist leader Bettino Craxi (Ignazi 1997). 
 
ß Figure 1 about here à 
 
In 1992, following Mani Pulite, it became necessary to form a new executive, led by a non-
politician and supported by the largest possible coalition. For that reason, in the Ciampi cabinet 
there were significant changes. For the first time two new parties, the PDS and the Greens, 
obtained ministerial offices: four ministers out of 28 belonged to new parties. However, this 
historical event did not have practical consequences, because already the day after the 
government had sworn in, 4 May 1993, the PDS and the Greens withdrew their ministers from 
the cabinet, as a form of protest because the Chamber of Deputies voted against the opening of 
a judicial investigation on Bettino Craxi. 
 




The watershed elections of 1994 show striking results for both indicators. For the first time, 
volatility reached values higher than 50 per cent; governmental innovation is even more 
pronounced and reached the highest peak ever (76.9 per cent), because the three main parties 
forming the governing coalition had never been in power before (FI, LN and AN). Volatility was 
very high also in 1995, as this was a non-partisan government vis-à-vis the almost complete 
absence of technocratic ministers of the previous cabinet (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014). As 
figure 1 shows, volatility keeps growing during the late 1990s – early 2010s period, consistently 
with the alternation of power between center-left and center-right. If we ignore the intra-
legislature government reshufflings,8 volatility shows continuously growing results (Prodi I: 79.9; 
Berlusconi I: 79.67; 2006: Prodi II: 82.1; Berlusconi II: 94.1) until Letta in 2013, when it falls again 
under 90 per cent (86.2). 
The 2018 Conte government, for the first time in Republican history, shows total volatility (100 
per cent). In fact, before, every executive had at least some ministers belonging to parties that 
were in power in the previous cabinet9; in 2018, there is a total disjunction with the past. If 
volatility is extraordinarily high, innovation, on the other hand, is relatively low, as the yellow-
green cabinet has a number of technocratic ministers, and the ‘nationalized’ Lega had been in 
power already in 1994, 2001 and 2008. Therefore, only the eight ministers from the M5S count 
for the governmental innovation.  
 
8. Comparative Analysis of the Three Functional Arenas 
So far, we have analyzed the innovation and volatility of the Italian party system separately for 
the three functional arenas. However, a number of insights comes from comparing these two 
characteristics in the three arenas together. As shown by figure 1, there is a clear-cut division in 
the three arenas between the pre- and post-1994 political system. In the long period between 
1953 and 1993, electoral and parliamentary volatility never exceeds 10 per cent, and consistently 
with the pure proportional system, these two indicators score almost identical results. 
Governmental volatility, on the other hand, has a more undulating trend, showing high peaks 
and low downs, but never reaching 50 per cent. 
 
ß Figure 2 about here à 
 
The election of 1992 showed some preliminary signs of disruption. Both electoral and 
parliamentary volatility show – at that time – the highest value since 1953, close to 20 per cent, 
while governmental volatility is still low. After 1994 then, electoral and parliamentary volatility 
show a much different and wavier pattern: it reaches peaks over 40 per cent, but also shrinks 
back to levels close to 10 per cent (in 2006). Yet again, the biggest pre- and post-1994 difference 
lies in the governmental volatility, never above 50 per cent first, and then always over 75 per 
cent. It is also worth noting how, using mixed proportional-majoritarian systems (Mattarellum 
                                                             
8 Also with the technocrat-led governments Dini and Monti, formed after political governments, volatility 
is higher than 50 per cent. 
9 Most notably, politicians from centrist parties, legacy of the DC-centered cabinets. 
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and Rosatellum) and the majority bonus proportional (Porcellum), the results of electoral and 
parliamentary volatility tend to diverge much more than with the previous proportional system. 
The current Rosatellum, in particular, is the electoral system that so far has led to the biggest 
discrepancy between the two volatilities, around 13 per cent.10 This is another element of novelty 
of the election of 2018, a moment of substantial halt in respect to the previous setting not only 
for the already mentioned full governmental volatility. 
 
ß Figure 3 about here à 
 
Additional insights come from the comparative analysis of innovation in the three arenas. Here, 
more than volatility, we can appreciate how 1994 and the two-stage process 2013-2018 were 
indeed moments of epochal change in the Italian party system. If we exclude these occasions, 
the index of innovation in all the three arenas never exceeds 12 per cent. In 1994, the result of 
new parties among the electorate and in the parliament (notably FI), led to a government where 
77 per cent of ministers belonged to new parties. Between 1996 and 2008, the years of 
bipolarism, these indexes go back to moderate levels. In 2013 the indexes of electoral and 
parliamentary innovation marks the first stage of the political ‘earthquake’ (Chiaramonte and 
Emanuele 2014). Mainly because of the exploit of the populist M5S,11 electoral innovation of 2013 
is, in fact, the highest of all Italian Republican history (40 per cent), way higher than the second 
highest, reached in 1994 (25 per cent). However, due to bonus of the Porcellum electoral law, 
favoring the winning center-left coalition, parliamentary innovation was limited to about 25 per 
cent, approximately the same score of 1994. If these effects, then, were not perceived in the 
governmental arena, with the formation of the continuity-oriented Letta cabinet characterized 
by extremely low governmental innovation, they would concern this arena too five years later, 
when the ‘tsunami’ was felt in all its strength. Despite the Lega having already been in power, 
and the surprisingly high number of technocratic ministers, the Conte government is, indeed, the 
second most innovative government since 1953. Therefore, if 1994 was the single moment of 
passage from one party system to another, in the 2010s the road towards a new system has taken 
five years, instead of happening in a single moment. 
 
9. Conclusions 
This study has analyzed what the Italian party system has changed to after the 2018 election. The 
impression of a significant change is widespread; this article has aimed at empirically assessing 
the degree of this change. Thanks to the historical analysis of the indexes of party volatility and 
innovation in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas, we have recognized a 
significant stability for the party system in all the arenas in the period 1953-1992. The seismic 
sensors of the Italian party system went haywire in 1994, when both the indicators skyrocketed 
at the same moment in the three arenas. Something different has happened in the 2018 general 
                                                             
10 In 2018, the parliamentary volatility scores about 29 per cent while the electoral volatility scores about 
42 per cent. 
11 Not only M5S, however: 2013 was also the election where the highest number of new parties emerged, 
5 in total: in addition to M5S, also Sinistra, Ecologia e Libertà, Fratelli d’Italia, Scelta Civica and Fare per 
Fermare il Declino reached at least 1 per cent of the votes.  
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elections. In fact, in this occasion, the volatility index reached new maximal levels only in the 
governmental area, as volatility in the other two arenas is lower than 5 years earlier. More 
important, the innovation index of the 2018 election, very high for the governmental arena, is 
relatively low for the electoral and the parliamentary ones. For this indicator too, the crucial 
moment of change has been the 2013 election.  
Therefore, at least two differences can be registered between the two reshaping events of the 
Italian party system. The first difference is that the change of the 1990s happened in only one 
moment, the 1994 election, in which the alliances of political parties (the forging of the electoral 
blocs) and the modification of the electoral system, rather than the voting behavior of citizens, 
had an impact on the transformation of the party system in all the three functional arenas. On 
the contrary, the change of 2013 was mostly a consequence of the voters’ strategies, being the 
electoral formula and the electoral alliances the same. The change in voting behavior, however, 
was enough to modify the electoral and the parliamentary faces of the Italian party system. But 
the variation in the governmental arena happened only in a second time, when a new change in 
the voters’ behavior, and not of the alliances’ strategies, run in parallel with the introduction of 
a new electoral formula. Only in 2018 therefore, i.e. after two elections, we can claim that the 
party system has changed as it had happened in 1994. For the first transformation of the party 
system, only one single moment was enough; for the second, two different occasions were 
necessary. However, we do not know yet if this could be interpreted as the passage towards a 
new ‘Third Republic’, as it has been already hypothesized (or auspicated) by some 
commentators. After all, it is still questionable whether the 1993 events truly embodied the 
transition from the ‘First’ to the ‘Second Republic’. In any case, only after the next election, if 
volatility and innovation in the three arenas will reduce substantially, then we could affirm that 
the Italian Republic has reached a new party system. A system that would then be fully 
consolidated in all the three different functional arenas, and therefore apt for being considered 
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 Table 1. Party and bloc electoral volatility, 1953-2018 
Electoral cycle (T1-T2) Party volatility at T2 Bloc volatility at T2 
1948-1953 12.4% n/a 
1953-1958 6.5% n/a 
1958-1963 7.7% n/a 
1963-1968 7.6% n/a 
1968-1972 5.9% n/a 
1972-1976 9.5% n/a 
1976-1979 5.5% n/a 
1979-1983 8.5% n/a 
1983-1987 8.1% n/a 
1987-1992 18.7% n/a 
1992-1994 40.9% n/a 
1994-1996 15.8% 22.6% 
1996-2001 22.8% 7.7% 
2001-2006 8.9% 5.4% 
2006-2008 16.9% 13.2% 
2008-2013 40.3% 32.5% 
2013-2018 29.7% 19.9% 
 




Table 2. Electoral innovation, 1953-2018 
Election Number of new parties 
New parties 
overall vote    
1953 0 0%  
1958 1 2.6% Partito Monarchico Popolare (2.63%) 
1963 0 0%  
1968 1 4.5% Partito Socialista di Unità Proletaria (4.45%) 
1972 0 0%  
1976 2 2.6% Partito Radicale (1.07%), Democrazia Proletaria (1.52%) 
1979 1 1.4% Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo (1.37%) 
1983 1 1.4% Partito Nazionale dei Pensionati (1.36%) 
1987 1 2.5% Lista Verdi (2.51%) 
1992 3 16.1% Rifondazione Comunista (5.62%), Movimento per la Democrazia - La Rete (1.86%), Lega Nord (8.65%) 
1994 3 26.9% Forza Italia (21.01%), Alleanza Democratica (1.18%), Patto Segni (4.68%) 
1996 1 4.3% Rinnovamento Italiano (4.34%) 
2001 3 8.0% Italia dei Valori (3.89%), Democrazia Europea (2.39%), Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (1.67%) 
2006 1 1.4% Popolari UDEUR (1.40%) 
2008 2 3.6% La Destra - Fiamma Tricolore (2.43%), Movimento per l'Autonomia (1.13%) 
2013 5 40.1% Sinistra Ecologia Libertà (3.20%), Fratelli d'Italia (1.96%), Scelta Civica (8.30%), Movimento Cinque Stelle (25.56%), Fare per Fermare il Declino (1.12%) 
2018 3 7.1% +Europa (2.56%), Liberi e Uguali (3.39%), Potere al Popolo (1.10%) 
 




Table 3. Party and bloc parliamentary volatility, 1953-2018 
Electoral cycle (T1-T2) Party volatility at T2 Bloc volatility at T2 
1948-1953 14.0% n/a 
1953-1958 6.6% n/a 
1958-1963 8.0% n/a 
1963-1968 6.8% n/a 
1968-1972 6.8% n/a 
1972-1976 8.9% n/a 
1976-1979 6.0% n/a 
1979-1983 8.4% n/a 
1983-1987 7.4% n/a 
1987-1992 18.5% n/a 
1992-1994 46.0% n/a 
1994-1996 21.7% 26.4% 
1996-2001 23.1% 11.4% 
2001-2006 13.8% 14.4% 
2006-2008 24.5% 16.2% 
2008-2013 44.8% 35.2% 
2013-2018 42.9% 42.9% 
 




Table 4. Parliamentary innovation, 1953-2018 
Election 
Number of new 
parties in 
Parliament 
N seats assigned 
to new parties 
% seats assigned 
to new parties   
1953 0 0 0%  
1958 1 14 2.4% Partito Monarchico Popolare (14) 
1963 0 0 0%  
1968 1 23 3.7% Partito Socialista di Unità Proletaria (23) 
1972 0 0 0%  
1976 2 10 1.6% Partito Radicale (4), Democrazia Proletaria (6) 
1979 1 6 1.0% Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo (6) 
1983 0 0 0%  
1987 1 13 2.1% Lista Verdi (13) 
1992 3 102 16.2% Rifondazione Comunista (35), Movimento per la Demorazia - La Rete (12), Lega Nord (55) 
1994 3 163 25.9% Forza Italia (132), Alleanza Democratica (18), Patto Segni (13) 
1996 1 26 4.1% Rinnovamento Italiano (26) 
2001 1 10 1.6% Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (10) 
2006 1 3 0.5% Popolari UDEUR (3) 
2008 1 8 1.3% Movimento per l'Autonomia (8) 
2013 4 163 26.4% Sinistra Ecologia Libertà (37), Fratelli d'Italia (9), Scelta Civica (38), Movimento Cinque Stelle (109) 
2018 2 16 2.6% +Europa (2), Liberi e Uguali (14) 
 




Table 6. Governmental composition and volatility, 1953-2018 














1953 2 Pella DC 19 0% 0% 100% 0% 
1954 2 Fanfani I DC 19 0% 0% 100% 0% 
1954 2 Scelba DC 21 0% 0% 100% 28.6% 
1955 2 Segni I DC 21 0% 0% 100% 0% 
1957 2 Zoli DC 21 0% 0% 100% 28.6% 
1958 3 Fanfani II DC 22 0% 0% 100% 18.2% 
1959 3 Segni II DC 24 0% 0% 100% 18.2% 
1960 3 Tambroni DC 23 0% 0% 100% 0% 
1960 3 Fanfani III DC 23 0% 0% 100% 0% 
1962 3 Fanfani IV DC 24 0% 0% 100% 12.5% 
1963 4 Leone I DC 20 0% 0% 100% 12.5% 
1963 4 Moro I DC 24 0% 16.7% 83.3% 37.5% 
1964 4 Moro II DC 24 0% 0% 100% 4.2% 
1966 4 Moro III DC 23 0% 0% 100% 8.0% 
1968 5 Leone II DC 22 0% 0% 100% 34.8% 
1968 5 Rumor I DC 25 0% 0% 100% 16.0% 
1969 5 Rumor II DC 23 0% 0% 100% 16.0% 
1970 5 Rumor III DC 26 0% 0% 100% 34.6% 
1970 5 Colombo DC 26 0% 0% 100% 3.8% 
1972 5 Andreotti I DC 25 0% 0% 100% 38.5% 
1972 6 Andreotti II DC 27 0% 0% 100% 29.6% 
1973 6 Rumor IV DC 29 0% 0% 100% 27.6% 
1974 6 Rumor V DC 26 0% 0% 100% 6.9% 
1974 6 Moro IV DC 25 0% 0% 100% 38.5% 
1976 6 Moro V DC 22 0% 0% 100% 20% 
1976 7 Andreotti III DC 21 4.8% 0% 95.2% 4.8% 
1978 7 Andreotti IV DC 22 4.5% 0% 95.5% 0.2% 
1979 7 Andreotti V DC 22 0% 0% 100% 22.7% 
1979 8 Cossiga I DC 25 0% 0% 100% 16.0% 
1980 8 Cossiga II DC 27 0% 0% 100% 44.4% 
1980 8 Forlani DC 27 0% 0% 100% 11.1% 
1981 8 Spadolini PRI 28 0% 0% 100% 5.3% 
1982 8 Spadolini II PRI 28 0% 0% 100% 0% 
1982 8 Fanfani V DC 28 0% 0% 100% 10.7% 
1983 9 Craxi I PSI 29 0% 0% 100% 12.1% 
1986 9 Craxi II PSI 29 0% 0% 100% 0% 
1987 9 Fanfani VI  DC 26 23.1% 0% 76.9% 48.3% 
1987 10 Goria DC 30 3.3% 0% 96.7% 46.7% 
1988 10 De Mita DC 31 0% 0% 100% 4.0% 
1989 10 Andreotti VI DC 31 0% 0% 100% 3.2% 
1991 10 Andreotti VII DC 32 0% 0% 100% 10.1% 
1992 11 Amato I PSI 26 7.7% 0% 92.3% 10.6% 
1993 11 Ciampi Technocratic 28 32.1% 14.3% 53.6% 38.7% 
1994 12 Berlusconi I FI 26 7.7% 76.9% 15.4% 76.9% 
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1995 12 Dini Technocratic 25 100% 0% 0% 92.3% 
1996 13 Prodi I Ulivo / Indep. 24 20.8% 12.5% 66.7% 79.2% 
1998 13 D'Alema I DS 26 11.5% 7.7% 80.8% 33.3% 
1999 13 D'Alema II DS 27 7.4% 7.4% 85.2% 16.2% 
2000 13 Amato II Technocratic 25 12.0% 0% 88.0% 13.8% 
2001 14 Berlusconi II FI 24 12.5% 0% 87.5% 79.7% 
2005 14 Berlusconi III FI 25 4.0% 0% 96.0% 19.0% 
2006 15 Prodi II Ulivo / Indep. 27 14.8% 11.1% 74.1% 82.1% 
2008 16 Berlusconi IV PDL 25 4.0% 0% 96.0% 94.1% 
2011 16 Monti Technocratic 20 100% 0% 0% 96.0% 
2013 17 Letta PD 22 13.6% 4.5% 81.8% 86.4% 
2014 17 Renzi PD 17 11.8% 0% 88.2% 19.3% 
2016 17 Gentiloni PD 19 0% 0% 100% 19.5% 
2018 18 Conte Independent 19 31.6% 42.1% 26.3% 100% 
 




Table 5. Governmental innovation. 1953-2018 
Year Government Party of Prime Minister Ministers from new parties 
1953 Pella DC   
1954 Fanfani I DC   
1954 Scelba DC   
1955 Segni I DC   
1957 Zoli DC    
1958 Fanfani II DC   
1959 Segni II DC   
1960 Tambroni DC   
1960 Fanfani III DC   
1962 Fanfani IV DC    
1963 Leone I DC   
1963 Moro I DC 4 Antonio Giolitti, Giovanni Pieraccini, Giacomo Mancini, Achille Corona (PSI) 
1964 Moro II DC   
1966 Moro III DC    
1968 Leone II DC   
1968 Rumor I DC   
1969 Rumor II DC   
1970 Rumor III DC   
1970 Colombo DC   
1972 Andreotti I DC    
1972 Andreotti II DC   
1973 Rumor IV DC   
1974 Rumor V DC   
1974 Moro IV DC   
1976 Moro V DC    
1976 Andreotti III DC   
1978 Andreotti IV DC   
1979 Andreotti V DC    
1979 Cossiga I DC   
1980 Cossiga II DC   
1980 Forlani DC   
1981 Spadolini PRI   
1982 Spadolini II PRI   
1982 Fanfani V DC    
1983 Craxi I PSI   
1986 Craxi II PSI   
1987 Fanfani VI  DC    
1987 Goria DC   
1988 De Mita DC   
1989 Andreotti VI DC   
1991 Andreotti VII DC    
1992 Amato I PSI   
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1993 Ciampi Technocratic 4 Francesco Rutelli (Verdi), Vincenzo Visco, Luigi Berlinguer, Augusto Barbera (PDS) 
1994 Berlusconi I FI 20 Ministers from Forza Italia, Lega Nord, Alleanza Nazionale. 
1995 Dini Technocratic    
1996 Prodi I Ulivo / Indep. 3 Lamberto Dini, Augusto Fantozzi, Tiziano Treu (Rinnovamento Italiano) 
1998 D'Alema I DS 2 Oliviero Diliberto, Katia Belillo (PdCI) 
1999 D'Alema II DS 2 Agazio Loiero, Salvatore Cardinale (UDEUR) 
2000 Amato II Technocratic    
2001 Berlusconi II FI   
2005 Berlusconi III FI    
2006 Prodi II Ulivo / Indep. 3 Antonio di Pietro (IdV), Paolo Ferrero (PRC), Emma Bonino (RI) 
2008 Berlusconi IV PDL   
2011 Monti Technocratic    
2013 Letta PD 1 Enzo Moavero Milanesi (SC) 
2014 Renzi PD   
2016 Gentiloni PD    
2018 Conte Independent 8 Ministers from M5S 
 




Figure 1. Governmental volatility, 1953-2018 
 
























































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Party system volatility in the three arenas, 1953-2018 
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Figure 3. Party system innovation in the three arenas, 1953-2018 
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